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ABSTRACT
Climate change with its potential to disrupt all facets of life on earth is 
arguably the greatest environmental threat that humankind has faced to 
date. The debates on the best methods and means of dealing with the 
threat are occupying the agendas of diverse actors in the international, 
national and local arenas. In an effort to address the effects of climate 
change, governments and policy-makers attempt to translate the results of 
this vibrant debate into meaningful policy at home. This article attempts 
to describe this journey from debate through policy into action, taking the 
complexities of policy environment into account. At the outset the largely 
divided international climate change regime endorses the contradictory 
stance of energy-intensive developing nations such as South Africa and 
inhibits the fostering of a meaningful climate change policy environment 
at a national level. The policy context with regard to climate change in 
South Africa is analysed and the salient causes of the troubled policy 
environment, aside from those commonly associated with developing 
nations, are identifi ed as largely administrative. Finally, the policy 
environment in South Africa is examined at local level and, while local 
governments enjoy more autonomy under the new dispensation, the 
administrative fragmentation experienced at a national level permeates 
down to the local sphere, with the EThekwini Municipality serving as a 
case in point. 
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INTRODUCTION
That climate change is a real and tangible threat to biodiversity is not debatable; 
a broad range of scientists has concurred with ‘very high confi dence’ that recent 
and accelerated warming of the planet is observable and is a direct result of 
human activity (IPCC 2007). We are, in fact, past the point where the warming 
of the earth can be avoided and global ‘distress’ is already in evidence with 
changes in rainfall patterns and a frequency of extreme weather events already 
occurring. To a large extent there is international consensus that climate change 
is a real problem which faces all nations and that action to temper its effects is 
required. The international debate informs, and to some extent dictates, national 
and even local climate change policy.
Despite the need for technical and scientifi c solutions to solve environmental 
problems, the environmental movement is unavoidably political (Van Reenen, 
1994:36). In the current context, while the problems associated with the effects 
of climate change are measured in scientifi c, economic and social terms, the 
implementation of solutions to these challenges is primarily political. Within the 
political arena the policy process can be identifi ed as the salient political vehicle 
that transports these solutions into society. The policy process includes, fi rstly, 
the identifi cation of a broad goal, or agenda setting; secondly, selecting the right 
strategy through which to achieve this goal; thirdly, identifying the appropriate 
means to ensure that the strategy works; and lastly, to set up a process of 
evaluation and monitoring to ensure the effectiveness of both the strategy and 
the means to implement it (Clark et al. 2000:1).
 For the purposes of this overview it is prudent to focus on the context in 
which the policy process takes place, i.e. the policy environment, which affects 
all three of the policy steps. The policy environment includes, inter alia, the 
political complexion of government and the dominant political ideologies of the 
day (Roberts 2004:140). A look at the current state of the international climate 
change regime will assist in setting the stage for a more focused look at national 
and local policy environments with regard to climate change. 
THE INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE REGIME
The international policy arena, within which attempts are made to reach consensus 
on mitigating and adapting to climate change, is fraught with complexity. Issues of 
sovereignty, equity, free trade and political ideology make reaching a consensus 
very diffi cult and, arguably, in some cases impossible. A plethora of agendas, 
both political and commercial, external to the immediate environmental concerns 
associated with climate change plague the international climate change regime. 
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While some progress has been made, there is an omnipresent state of ossifi cation 
affecting the climate change regime.
Ossifi cation of the International Climate Change Regime
The proliferation of stalemates and the recycling of already agreed upon issues 
that typically disrupt international forums on climate change serve as good 
examples of ossifi cation – the regime has stopped learning and fails to table, 
adequately absorb or act upon new information. This ‘pathology’ prevents 
the regime from furthering new debates and forces the regime to remain 
entrenched in ‘outdated’ paradigms that stunt progress. A further indicator is 
the entrenchment of coalitions and political alliances and the continuation of 
negative dialogue and mistrust between them; the developing country Group 
of 77 (G-77), the European Union (EU) and the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) are notable examples. One of the most salient 
fi ssures in the climate change regime is the long-standing North/South divide, 
where ideological and historical differences continue to dominate (Depledge, 
2006:2-4). 
There are several causes or reasons why this impasse has been reached and 
why it is so diffi cult to overcome. Firstly, the inherent complexity of the climate 
change debate with its myriad of subjects and concerns coupled with the great 
diversity of interests and opinions can in large part be seen as contributing to 
the problem. Secondly, the institutional classifi cation of annex 1 (industrialised) 
and non-annex 1 (mostly developing) countries is itself problematic and 
exacerbates the North/South divide. Countries are not arranged according 
to any identifi ed objective criteria and each category has its own rights and 
responsibilities further widening the political fi ssure that exists between 
these two groups. Thirdly, the ‘consensus’ approach to decision making, as is 
prevalent in the UN system, where a decision can be passed as long as there is 
no stated objection to it, has made the decision-making process terribly slow. 
Fourthly, the negative and derailing effect of obstructionist states such as Saudi 
Arabia, which block discussion and raise as many objections as possible, slow 
down the decision-making process. Lastly, the decision by the US, arguably the 
single most important actor in the global climate change regime, not to ratify 
the Kyoto Protocol has been a big stumbling block. One of the most signifi cant 
contributors to climate change-inducing emissions and a country with advanced 
technological and intellectual capacity is now outside the regime (Depledge 
2006:4-16). 
South Africa is morally bound to make informed and responsible decisions 
regarding climate change as the nation makes a signifi cant contribution to global 
climate change; it is ranked 14th for national CO2 emissions worldwide (WRI 
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2006). Despite this, South Africa, as a non-annex I nation, is not required to 
set emissions reduction targets and may continue to burn fossil fuels without 
compromise until 2012, when the emissions reduction targets for developing 
countries will be reviewed (UNFCCC 2006). The international climate change 
regime allows for the existence of this apparent contradiction and, until such 
time as the impasse between North and South can be resolved and a decision 
reached on emissions targets for developing nations, it will continue. A further 
concern, and a consequence of the ossifi cation of the climate change regime, 
is the atmosphere of relative lawlessness in which transnational corporations 
(TNCs) are permitted to operate.
Business and Industry in the International 
Climate Change Regime
In the last 35 years the global economy has seen a dramatic increase in the 
magnitude of foreign direct investment (FDI) and the number of associated TNCs. 
As TNCs often invest in environmentally sensitive sectors, they play a signifi cant 
role in environmental politics and policy. This is an especially important 
consideration in developing countries, where FDI has the ability to have signifi cant 
impacts on both the economy and the environment. In developing countries 
they have tremendous capacity, by threatening relocation and disinvestment, to 
persuade governments to promote the relaxing of environmental regulations in 
order to step up investment and development opportunities. Furthermore, the 
voice of industrial lobby groups at notable international environmental summits 
is clearly and unanimously opposed to legally binding treaties on corporate 
accountability, especially with regard to corporate liability for environmental 
damages as a result of their operations (Clapp 2005:23-31). To date no legally 
binding treaty exists and, although the effectiveness of ‘hard’ or legally binding 
constraints is debatable (see Birger et al. 2006:104-119), it remains a concern 
that TNCs remain largely unaccountable for their actions. 
Policy at a national, and even local, level is thus affected and shaped by the 
position of the state within the climate change debate and by its susceptibility to 
infl uence from business and industry.
THE STATE AND THE CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY PROCESS
In broad terms global environmental change challenges the state, and ultimately 
the policy process, in two fundamental ways. Firstly, the urgency of the problem 
necessitates mitigation and adaptive responses that stress the administrative, 
technological and fi nancial capacities of the state. Secondly, climate such change 
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increases the mutual dependence of states, thereby undermining the strength of 
state sovereignty. The combination of these additional stresses challenges the 
state in its ability to conduct effective government and provide internal security 
(Biermann and Dingwerth 2004:2, 3). The former stress in particular makes the 
delivery of effective and meaningful policy challenging, especially in developing 
nations, where the aforementioned capacities are strained even under normal 
circumstances. 
In the policy process there is a transformation of the policy discourse as 
it is absorbed into the institutional framework; there is a bridging of the gap 
between the rhetoric of the policy discourse and the embracing of this discourse 
by institutions and its actors. In this vein, policies cannot be seen as objective 
or neutral tools, but instead as products of discursive struggles (Bäckstrand & 
Lövbrand 2006:52). The policy environment, although fundamentally defi ned 
by the state, is therefore open to infl uence from a number of national and 
international non-state actors, including industry, commerce/business, NGOs 
and civil society.
The role of the state in environmental management can be summed up 
as unique, necessary and indispensable. Unique in that the logic of the state 
goes beyond market forces to include dimensions such as ethics and social 
justice; necessary because market forces cannot regulate ‘public goods’; 
and indispensable because it addresses issues such as climate change and 
biodiversity, which cannot be dealt with adequately in exclusively economic 
discourse (Guimaraes 2004:205-206). In this regard the electorate entrusts the 
state, as custodian of the natural environment within its boundaries, to prevent 
environmental degradation to the detriment of the wellbeing of its population. 
In many states, including South Africa, the right to ‘an environment that is not 
harmful to their health or well-being’ is constitutionally enshrined (Republic of 
South Africa 1996). 
South Africa and the Policy Process
There are many challenging hindrances to the delivery of a meaningful climate 
change policy process in South Africa. The crosscutting nature of climate 
change necessitates a holistic examination of the policy process, because of its 
implications not only for biodiversity and the quality of essential environmental 
services, but for all sectors of society. 
Environmental Rights and the South African Electorate
Examining the importance of constitutional environmental obligations, in the form 
of rights, in South Africa will serve as a precursor to a more detailed discussion 
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on the diffi culties of the policy process. Although outside the immediate 
parameters of the policy process, popular knowledge of environmental rights has 
great potential to stimulate public debate and lend credence to environmental 
policies. A popular knowledge of environmental rights, in conjunction with 
other rights such as a right to freedom of speech, creates the necessary space 
for the electorate to act, if government is not performing on environmental 
obligations. In Van Reenan’s words: “[there] is no more effective watchdog than 
an informed electorate” (1994:39). 
The South African electorate is not suffi ciently aware of the issues to play 
the role of watchdog in this regard. Research on this subject revealed that a 
large number of South Africans were uncertain as to the exact meaning of the 
term ‘rights of the people’ (Deegan 2002:50). An alert and aware populace, 
backed by environmental rights, is able to check, or popularise concern about, 
state environmental policy if such policy works contrary to the role of the state 
as custodian of the natural environment. Furthermore an informed electorate 
may, through public comment, lend credence and value to the agenda-
setting stage of the policy process. Regrettably, however, and not surprisingly 
given the inequitable access to education in the apartheid era, there is a 
popular ignorance of, and indeed a lack of interest in the signifi cance of, the 
major tenets of democracy in favour of, again not surprisingly, job creation, 
housing and education (Deegan 2002:49). The reality of the South African 
policy environment with regards to the electorate is that there is a dire need 
for awareness and education. In addition poverty, crime, inadequate state 
performance and undeveloped civic responsibility are salient challenges that 
must be addressed, if South Africa is to achieve a measure of success with 
regards to sustainable development (Rossouw and Wiseman 2004:134), of 
which climate change policy is a fundamental an arguably inseparable part. 
The Institutional and Administrative Context 
of Environmental Management
Under the apartheid-era government environmental policy making was centralised 
and technocratically driven and environmental interests were often trumped by 
industrial and business concerns. In addition, the opinions of civil society were 
largely ignored (Peart & Wilson 1998:239-240). Law making was centralised and 
implementation, enforcement and administration of these environmental laws 
and policies were divided between government departments and agencies. In 
short, then, law and policy formation were centralised, while enforcement and 
regulation were dispersed. 
Currently one fi nds a decentralised approach to both the formation and 
the implementation of environmental policy. This division of responsibility 
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between the national and provincial departments in environmental law making 
and administration has resulted in a fragmentation of environmental law and a 
lack of co-ordination with regard to administration and enforcement. Human 
resources have been diluted across too broad a spectrum and it is too costly to 
maintain a large number of departments at national, provincial and local level 
that deal with environmental affairs (Loots 1996:81-86). Furthermore, despite 
the national presence of the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism, 
the administration of the environment is handled by the following departments: 
Mineral Affairs and Energy, Land Affairs, Water Affairs and Forestry, Agriculture, 
South African National Parks and others. This situation is further exacerbated by 
the lack of synergy between the environmental departments at provincial level; 
in the Western Cape, for example, one fi nds the Department of Environment 
Affairs and Development Planning, while the Northern Province has the 
Department of Agriculture, Land and Environment (Glazewski 2005:130-131). 
In addition, as far as environmental matters are concerned, the state has 
detailed areas of exclusive and concurrent competencies with respect to the 
three spheres of government (national, provincial and local) in Schedules 4 and 
5 of the National Environmental Management Act No. 107 (Republic of South 
Africa, 1998). The former relates to items where provinces exercise concurrent 
competencies with national government, while in the latter items of exclusive 
provincial competence are set out. Part B in both schedules lists items of local 
authority competence, where local government has been afforded executive 
authority. Part B matters relating to the environment include ‘Air Pollution’, for 
example, while the more generic ‘pollution control’ is listed as a concurrent 
national and provincial item. There are indeed some areas such as water, 
minerals and energy, for example, that are not listed in Schedules 4 or 5, as 
these are areas of exclusive national competence (Glazewski 2005:132-138).
The delegation of concurrent responsibilities creates a climate of confusion 
and uncertainty, and further strains the administrative capacities of all spheres 
of government. This fragmentation has made co-ordination between policies 
and departments diffi cult and the complexity of the current arrangement 
challenges the national objectives of co-operative governance and integrated 
environmental management. Furthermore, duplication is common and this 
has resulted in a broad range of overlapping mandates and interests, and has 
highlighted the need for a clearer separation of implementation and monitoring 
functions. The latter is clearly evident in the Department of Minerals and Energy 
(DEM), which is responsible both for promoting resource extraction and the 
monitoring and managing the impacts of extraction (Rossouw & Wiseman 
2004:132). Aggravating this, the fragmentation of government into departments 
encourages a ‘special interest’ approach to public policy that results in each 
ministry tending to focus most heavily on the interests of the key producers 
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and professionals in that policy sphere. For example, energy ministers tend to 
view their primary role as protecting the interests of the major energy producers 
(such as coal and nuclear power) and as a result may downplay environmental 
damage associated with the energy sector (Carter 2001:174). 
A further result of this fragmented policy landscape is the fact that 
environmental policies are often developed in isolation from otherwise related 
policies. Land use policies, such as the Development Facilitation Act 67 of 1995, 
which have huge potential to impact on the environment, have been developed 
independently of environmental policy initiatives (Peart & Wilson 1998:264). 
The end result of this fragmented policy landscape has been what can be 
referred to as a ‘policy mess’, where different policies that cover the same areas 
pursue different or even confl icting objectives (Peart & Wilson 1998:243). The 
deluge of policies since 1994 has made integration and co-ordination of policies 
diffi cult and encouraged overlap and – despite their good intentions – they have 
been very diffi cult to implement, indicating a somewhat idealised approach in 
the policy development stage. In sum, the general weaknesses in the policy 
process include the following: key issues are not identifi ed or prioritised; a lack 
of institutional capacity; strong opposition to policy from within departments; 
tight time frames that don’t allow for a thorough public participation process; 
confusion as a result of a lack of consistency in the policy process; a lack of 
clearly defi ned responsibilities and roles; duplication of effort; a lack of social 
and economic information and, when it is available, it is poorly integrated 
with environmental issues; a lack of technical environmental information in 
the development and monitoring of policy; bias in favour of dominant interest 
groups and the exclusion or misrepresentation of certain groups; and fi nally, a 
lack of monitoring and evaluation, partly because the technology to do so has 
not been developed and there are insuffi cient sustainability indicators to aid 
monitoring (Clark et al. 2000:11-13). In large part this long list of weaknesses can 
be attributed to the complex administrative landscape and policy environment 
in which environmental management is situated. 
It is beyond the ambit of this discussion to seek solutions to the administrative 
and institutional arrangements in environmental matters, but it is important 
to note that the current national policy environment does not encourage the 
incubation of effective and meaningful policy that is required if climate change 
and its effects are to be dealt with effectively. 
The Status of the Environment in the Policy Environment
According to Saward (1998:352), the scope within the administrative hierarchy to 
allow for the upward mobility of the environmental ministry is a core consideration 
in environmental policy processes. This consideration is clearly lacking in the 
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South African context and this mobility defi cit will exacerbate the current low-
priority status of climate change and related environmental issues at national level. 
Indeed offi cials in many departments, at all levels of government, simply do not 
see climate change as a priority and, in fact, some even view it as working contrary 
to national development priorities. This is hardly surprising, given that there is a 
limited awareness within government departments as to the likely consequences 
of climate change (Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2004:v). 
Furthermore, from a policy implementation perspective, government is trying to 
do too much with too few resources and prioritising policies and their outcomes 
is clearly lacking (Peart & Wilson 1998:263). Prioritisation is sorely needed, given 
the inability of authorities to deliver in many areas of environmental policy. For 
environmental policy to be effective it needs to be able to fi t into a clearly defi ned 
policy hierarchy, and for the more urgent environmental issues, such as climate 
change, to be awarded priority status. Some attempt was made to address this 
by placing DEAT as the lead agent in the policy-making arena to ensure that 
government policies in all areas do not confl ict with national environmental 
objectives. The subsequent National Environmental Management Act of 1998, 
however, severely diluted the potency of DEAT’s governing role in this regard by 
stipulating that such environmental principles must be considered alongside other 
relevant considerations, such as the social and economic rights detailed in Chapter 
2 of the Constitution. Furthermore, the cooperative governance approach, where 
government departments are persuaded to work more closely together, has been 
adopted and this further dampens hope of DEAT playing a lead role, with the 
likely outcome that the department’s views will regularly be outweighed by those 
of other departments (Peart & Wilson 1998:244-245). 
Economic Challenges
Environmental matters in general have perhaps not featured to the extent they 
should have on the national economic agenda, but what of climate change in 
particular? The ‘National Climate Change Response Strategy for South Africa’ is 
a formalised expression of mitigation/adaptive options available to the climate 
change policy process as well as an expression of the policy boundaries and 
challenges. While there is recognition of the urgent attention needed to address 
climate change and the very real threats it poses to national goals of, inter alia, 
sustainable development and poverty alleviation, great concern is expressed 
about the nation’s two vital industries, mining and energy. In short, if annex 
1 nations respond negatively to the exporting of coal, the vitality of the South 
African economy, which is heavily dependent on income generated from the 
production, processing, export and consumption of coal, will be compromised 
(Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2004:iv).
Administratio Publica | Vol 17 No 2 May 2009152
 This very real concern can be seen as an economically orientated policy 
boundary or constraint, and it highlights an apparent contradiction in efforts 
to mitigate the effects of climate change; a large proportion of the country’s 
emissions are a direct result of this heavy dependence on coal, yet South 
Africa will continue to rely on coal for decades to come. Indeed the major 
parastatal energy producer, ESKOM, does not internalise the external social or 
environmental costs, which can amount to as much as 126% of the private cost 
of producing energy from coal (Blignaut & Zunckel 2004; 300). Including these 
external costs would raise the cost of energy for the consumer and thereby 
potentially reduce the competitiveness of energy-intensive industries. It is not 
atypical of governments to fail to take measures to improve environmental 
performance and internalise environmental costs, if it is economically 
burdensome on a domestic level to do so and thereby reduce that country’s 
ability to compete fi nancially on a global level (Guimaraes 2004:209). 
Furthermore, this highlights the myopia inherent in electoral politics, which 
stunts or indeed stops the development of policies that imply costs for current 
generations in order to benefi t future generations (Roberts 2004:165).
THE POLICY ENVIRONMENT AT LOCAL LEVEL 
The international climate change regime has indeed fostered learning, but that 
learning is most prevalent outside of the international arena at other levels, 
including domestic, and in many cases is generating imaginative responses 
(Depledge 2006:18&19). Domestic- or local-level action and policy formation 
are thus not to be underestimated and much can be done to address the 
challenges of climate change at this level, despite international ossifi cation and 
policy defi cits at a national level. Arguing for this decentralised approach, Okidi 
(1996:56) points out that the ‘machinery’ in close proximity to the environmental 
resource should have jurisdiction over its management – in this case, it would 
be local government.
Local governments in South Africa enjoy a great degree of independence 
and the power to make by-laws and impose rates (Glazewski 2005:136). 
Furthermore, the Constitution states that one of the objects of local government 
is to ‘promote a safe and healthy environment’ (Republic of South Africa, 1996). 
Local governments therefore not only have the power to manage their own 
environments, but are constitutionally obliged to do so. 
In the policy process the local sphere of government in South Africa is largely 
responsible for the implementation of policy formed at national and provincial 
levels. Central government tends to develop broader policies and these can be 
detailed at local and provincial levels (Clark et al. 2000:7). This has presented a 
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myriad of problems or challenges at a local level. Among these are a failure to 
consult local government in policy formation and a failure to recognise the role 
of local government in this process. Furthermore, local government suffers from 
a lack of representation in core national environmental legislation, indicative of 
the policy implementation gaps that plague the policy atmosphere in South Africa 
(Rossouw and Wiseman 2004:133, 134). A further problem experienced at local 
level is that of capacity; the highly beauracratised environmental management 
system often results in the passing of legislation or the issuing of regulations 
without considering the lack of capacity to support this response (Van Reenen 
1994: 39; Glazewski 2005:132). Local governments need to be capacitated and 
skilled in order to deal with the complexity of climate change-related matters. 
The close proximity of local government to its constituency demands 
interaction and communication with it. Local governments in South Africa 
have a role to play that extends beyond the ambit of service delivery to include 
fostering and managing the participation of marginalized and excluded groups, 
thereby encouraging a democratic approach to council activities and ultimately 
promoting community involvement (Deegan 2002:52). In South Africa the policy 
processes are highly regarded for their high levels of public participation and 
the inclusion of civil society is often seen as a prerequisite for a sustainable and 
representative policy process (Clark et al. 2000:10). But this process, although 
necessary, is cumbersome and presents an additional challenge to the policy 
process. Local communities are by defi nition a diverse group consisting of a 
myriad of income groups, races and social classes, all with different interests, 
priorities and values. This diversity of interests will result in a confl ict of interests 
and local government must therefore act as the fi nal arbitrator in this volley of 
confl icting interests, and it is unlikely that any one interest group will have its 
desires met in full (Deegan 2002:52). Acting as arbitrator and managing public 
participation is time consuming and costly, and it stretches local government 
capacities. Given the diversity of adaptations that civil society may be required 
to undertake and comment on in support of a climate change policy, this lack of 
capacity represents a core consideration in policy environment. 
Case Study: 
The EThekwini Municipality and Climate Change Policy
The EThekwini Municipal Area (EMA) is situated on South Africa’s east coast 
littoral in the province of KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) and covers an area of 2297 
square kilometres. Although only 1.4% of the land area of KZN, it houses over 
30% of the population of KZN and as much as 60% of the provinces economic 
activity occurs here. Within the municipal limits a broad diversity of land uses 
occurs including residential, commercial, industrial and agricultural, with a 
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number of densely populated informal settlements found within urban and peri-
urban areas. The community is similarly diverse, representing a cross-section 
of race, culture, religion, income group and age. EMA is South Africa’s major 
port city and is the second largest industrial hub after Gauteng. The city is a key 
trade gateway as a result of its access to important trading routes to the east and 
its proximity to the mineral-industrial complex of Gauteng. The city’s economy 
grew by 5.3% for the period 2005-2006. The municipality recognises its role 
in providing democratic and accountable governance, providing services, 
promoting socio-economic development and a safe and healthy environment 
(EThekwini Municipality 2007:6, 7). 
 In response to the growing realisation of the negative implications of 
climate change and the requisite mitigation and adaptive strategies, the EMA 
commissioned the CSIR to detail a report on the climatic future of Durban 
(CSIR 2006). Salient predictions as to the likely consequences of climate change 
include, inter alia, an increase in temperature, a rise in sea level and associated 
storm surges, a change in rainfall distribution, a reduction in the water 
available for consumption and industry, a decrease in agricultural production, 
the spreading of malaria into the EMA and a loss of biodiversity (CSIR 2006: 
59-77). These effects, although still clouded with degrees of uncertainty, are 
certainly dire and it is prudent to consider in the light of the precautionary 
principle 
In the light of the abovementioned signifi cance of public participation, an 
initial step, and indeed challenge, for the EMA is to gain public support for 
climate change policies. In order to instigate signifi cant change to society with 
regards to environmental issues, ‘winning the hearts and minds of most sections 
of society’ is essential (Roberts 2004:166). Given the aforementioned diversity 
of the population of Durban, this is no easy task. In an attempt to understand 
public perception of climate change in the EMA more fully, a questionnaire-
based research programme was conducted (CSIR 2006: 116-153). 46% of the 
respondents claimed they did not know much about climate change, or that 
they knew nothing at all. It was concluded that the majority of respondents have 
a limited understanding of climate change and, furthermore, are unaware as to 
the causes of climate change. Most participants viewed themselves as external 
to the solution and commonly believed that it was up to industry to fi nd the 
answers (CSIR 2006:126). Education and raising awareness on the subject of 
climate change can be viewed as a critical challenge to the EMA, if there is to 
be support for local climate change policy initiatives. 
A further challenge is the apparent power defi cit that inhibits the 
effectiveness of the city’s environmental authority. The Environmental 
Management Department (EMD) of the EMA does not have the power to 
make fi nal decisions on environmental applications, although its comments 
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are usually taken into account and required conditions, instigated by the EMD, 
‘usually become conditions of approval’. The EMD is therefore a commenting 
authority requiring the department to communicate with other departments 
and authorities, not only at local, but also at provincial and national level. 
This has necessitated the creation of a forum between the EMD and the 
provincial Department of Agriculture and Environmental Affairs. This forum 
has been established to aid communications between the two spheres of 
government and assist in reducing confl ict between the two. The EMD is 
currently attempting the creation of a similar forum to communicate with the 
Department of Minerals and Energy. These forums are an integral part of the 
principles of cooperative governance (EThekwini Municipality 2007:42). The 
need for the creation of forums is indicative of the administrative powerlessness 
of the EMD and it is postulated here that this process exacerbates problems 
associated with a lack of capacity. Furthermore, this cumbersome process 
highlights that the great need for environmental departments to move up the 
hierarchy, as discussed above in a national context, also applies to a local 
level. This mobility defi cit stunts the EMD’s ability to fast-track policy and is 
bound to entrench an approach of incremental change in the policy process, 
rather than the need for rapid adjustment that meaningful and effective climate 
change policy demands. 
Mapping the progress of a core environmental policy process found within 
the EMA will serve to highlight how these hierarchical challenges have affected 
the EMD in its environmental, and ultimately social, obligations. The Durban 
Metropolitan Open Space System (D’MOSS), initially instigated by an NGO in 
1979, survived the transition politics of the democratisation of South Africa in the 
early 1990s by shifting focus to include socio-economic and equity concerns. 
By conserving and carefully managing the open spaces within municipal 
limits the D’MOSS system is designed to ensure the sustainable delivery of 
environmental goods and services. In 2001 D’MOSS was reconstituted as the 
EThekweni Environmental Services Management Plan (EESMP) and 54% of the 
EMA surface area was deemed as optimal and set aside for the open space 
system for the city. Growing development pressure and an attempt to secure 
long-term political support for the programme, however, required that the size 
of the system be reduced from 123 000 ha to 76 000 ha. In 2002 the area was 
remapped and reassessed, and once again, in order to accommodate the city’s 
pressing development needs, only those areas vital to the viability of the system 
were included and the total was further reduced from 76 000 ha to 63 115 ha 
(or 27% of the EMA) (EThekwini Municipality 2007:11). The salient trend in this 
programme has been the reduction in the size of the open space area (from 
54% to 27%) and this is a direct result of political and development pressure. 
The EMD does not have suffi cient capacity to challenge these reductions and 
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in its capacity as a commenting authority it can do little more than lobby for 
support for its initiatives. 
Related to this power defi cit is the inability of the EMD to effectively 
implement regulations to ensure the integrity of the EESMP. Power, in this 
instance, refers to the extent of power that municipalities have over their 
constituencies rather than the power to move within the administrative hierarchy 
as discussed above. In short, the EMD has no legal mandate to enforce the law 
and the department must seek other means to enforce regulation. One method 
used by the department when dealing with non-compliance from the public 
sector is compliance monitoring. To this end the EMD endeavours to ensure that 
the relevant government departments take action when there is non-compliance 
with regulations (EThekwini Municipality 2007:47). Lacking the power therefore 
to enforce its own regulations, the EMD has to rely on other departments to give 
these regulations clout. This is a seemingly cumbersome process that demands 
time and effort from departments outside the environmental management 
framework and has the potential to exacerbate the capacity issues that plague 
the local administration. In response to this the EMD has intentions of drafting 
‘green’ environmental by-laws to protect the natural resource base of the EMA 
and to ensure the effective implementation on EESMP, but this has yet to be 
realised (EThekwini Municipality 2007:47). For the effective and meaningful 
implementation of climate change policy, this is an essential step forward. In 
the latter half of 2007 it was proposed that the EESMP should be revised once 
again and climate change (and its impacts on biodiversity) will be introduced 
into the plan (EThekwini Municipality 2007:18). Without the requisite power 
and the inability to move upwards in the administrative hierarchy, the EMD has 
limited potential to make a meaningful contribution towards providing a safe 
and healthy environment for its citizenry. 
To a large extent local municipalities suffer from the same economically 
orientated policy boundaries as national government. 
CONCLUSION
Mitigating the effects of climate change and learning to adapt to these 
consequences requires good governance on international, national and domestic 
levels. The delivery of good governance is realised in large part through the 
implementation of meaningful and effective policy that is dependent on a 
healthy policy environment for success. This policy environment is infl uenced 
by, inter alia, international, national and local agendas as well as administrative 
and legal arrangements. An attempt has been made in this article to highlight 
the negative infl uences of these agendas on the policy environment. Because of 
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the great scale of this environmental problem, climate change policy demands 
the rapid formulation of policy and effective implementation.
 An examination of the situation in practice, however, highlights some of the 
more salient reasons for the shortcomings in this regard. On an international level 
the climate change debate is stifl ed by the diversity of confl icting agendas and 
the North/South divide, leaving the critical issue of emissions reduction targets 
unsolved. The knock-on effects of this are felt at a national level and to some 
extent pollute the South African policy environment. Aggravating this are complex 
administrative systems that complicate the policy environment and limit the potency 
of environmental authorities to deliver on their environmental and ultimately social 
obligations. At a local level the policy process is similarly fl awed, aggravated by 
the weighty responsibility of acting as arbitrator in the public participation process 
and a lack of capacity. The struggles experienced by the environmental authority 
of the Ethekwini Municipality are examples of these challenges. 
NOTES
1 This article forms part of an ongoing research project supported by the National Research 
Foundation
2 This article is based on a research paper by Richard White in partial fulfi lment of the requirements 
for obtaining a Masters degree in Environmental Management at Stellenbosch University
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ABSTRACT
Climate change with its potential to disrupt all facets of life on earth is 
arguably the greatest environmental threat that humankind has faced to 
date. The debates on the best methods and means of dealing with the 
threat are occupying the agendas of diverse actors in the international, 
national and local arenas. In an effort to address the effects of climate 
change, governments and policy-makers attempt to translate the results of 
this vibrant debate into meaningful policy at home. This article attempts 
to describe this journey from debate through policy into action, taking the 
complexities of policy environment into account. At the outset the largely 
divided international climate change regime endorses the contradictory 
stance of energy-intensive developing nations such as South Africa and 
inhibits the fostering of a meaningful climate change policy environment 
at a national level. The policy context with regard to climate change in 
South Africa is analysed and the salient causes of the troubled policy 
environment, aside from those commonly associated with developing 
nations, are identifi ed as largely administrative. Finally, the policy 
environment in South Africa is examined at local level and, while local 
governments enjoy more autonomy under the new dispensation, the 
administrative fragmentation experienced at a national level permeates 
down to the local sphere, with the EThekwini Municipality serving as a 
case in point. 
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INTRODUCTION
That climate change is a real and tangible threat to biodiversity is not debatable; 
a broad range of scientists has concurred with ‘very high confi dence’ that recent 
and accelerated warming of the planet is observable and is a direct result of 
human activity (IPCC 2007). We are, in fact, past the point where the warming 
of the earth can be avoided and global ‘distress’ is already in evidence with 
changes in rainfall patterns and a frequency of extreme weather events already 
occurring. To a large extent there is international consensus that climate change 
is a real problem which faces all nations and that action to temper its effects is 
required. The international debate informs, and to some extent dictates, national 
and even local climate change policy.
Despite the need for technical and scientifi c solutions to solve environmental 
problems, the environmental movement is unavoidably political (Van Reenen, 
1994:36). In the current context, while the problems associated with the effects 
of climate change are measured in scientifi c, economic and social terms, the 
implementation of solutions to these challenges is primarily political. Within the 
political arena the policy process can be identifi ed as the salient political vehicle 
that transports these solutions into society. The policy process includes, fi rstly, 
the identifi cation of a broad goal, or agenda setting; secondly, selecting the right 
strategy through which to achieve this goal; thirdly, identifying the appropriate 
means to ensure that the strategy works; and lastly, to set up a process of 
evaluation and monitoring to ensure the effectiveness of both the strategy and 
the means to implement it (Clark et al. 2000:1).
 For the purposes of this overview it is prudent to focus on the context in 
which the policy process takes place, i.e. the policy environment, which affects 
all three of the policy steps. The policy environment includes, inter alia, the 
political complexion of government and the dominant political ideologies of the 
day (Roberts 2004:140). A look at the current state of the international climate 
change regime will assist in setting the stage for a more focused look at national 
and local policy environments with regard to climate change. 
THE INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE REGIME
The international policy arena, within which attempts are made to reach consensus 
on mitigating and adapting to climate change, is fraught with complexity. Issues of 
sovereignty, equity, free trade and political ideology make reaching a consensus 
very diffi cult and, arguably, in some cases impossible. A plethora of agendas, 
both political and commercial, external to the immediate environmental concerns 
associated with climate change plague the international climate change regime. 
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While some progress has been made, there is an omnipresent state of ossifi cation 
affecting the climate change regime.
Ossifi cation of the International Climate Change Regime
The proliferation of stalemates and the recycling of already agreed upon issues 
that typically disrupt international forums on climate change serve as good 
examples of ossifi cation – the regime has stopped learning and fails to table, 
adequately absorb or act upon new information. This ‘pathology’ prevents 
the regime from furthering new debates and forces the regime to remain 
entrenched in ‘outdated’ paradigms that stunt progress. A further indicator is 
the entrenchment of coalitions and political alliances and the continuation of 
negative dialogue and mistrust between them; the developing country Group 
of 77 (G-77), the European Union (EU) and the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) are notable examples. One of the most salient 
fi ssures in the climate change regime is the long-standing North/South divide, 
where ideological and historical differences continue to dominate (Depledge, 
2006:2-4). 
There are several causes or reasons why this impasse has been reached and 
why it is so diffi cult to overcome. Firstly, the inherent complexity of the climate 
change debate with its myriad of subjects and concerns coupled with the great 
diversity of interests and opinions can in large part be seen as contributing to 
the problem. Secondly, the institutional classifi cation of annex 1 (industrialised) 
and non-annex 1 (mostly developing) countries is itself problematic and 
exacerbates the North/South divide. Countries are not arranged according 
to any identifi ed objective criteria and each category has its own rights and 
responsibilities further widening the political fi ssure that exists between 
these two groups. Thirdly, the ‘consensus’ approach to decision making, as is 
prevalent in the UN system, where a decision can be passed as long as there is 
no stated objection to it, has made the decision-making process terribly slow. 
Fourthly, the negative and derailing effect of obstructionist states such as Saudi 
Arabia, which block discussion and raise as many objections as possible, slow 
down the decision-making process. Lastly, the decision by the US, arguably the 
single most important actor in the global climate change regime, not to ratify 
the Kyoto Protocol has been a big stumbling block. One of the most signifi cant 
contributors to climate change-inducing emissions and a country with advanced 
technological and intellectual capacity is now outside the regime (Depledge 
2006:4-16). 
South Africa is morally bound to make informed and responsible decisions 
regarding climate change as the nation makes a signifi cant contribution to global 
climate change; it is ranked 14th for national CO2 emissions worldwide (WRI 
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2006). Despite this, South Africa, as a non-annex I nation, is not required to 
set emissions reduction targets and may continue to burn fossil fuels without 
compromise until 2012, when the emissions reduction targets for developing 
countries will be reviewed (UNFCCC 2006). The international climate change 
regime allows for the existence of this apparent contradiction and, until such 
time as the impasse between North and South can be resolved and a decision 
reached on emissions targets for developing nations, it will continue. A further 
concern, and a consequence of the ossifi cation of the climate change regime, 
is the atmosphere of relative lawlessness in which transnational corporations 
(TNCs) are permitted to operate.
Business and Industry in the International 
Climate Change Regime
In the last 35 years the global economy has seen a dramatic increase in the 
magnitude of foreign direct investment (FDI) and the number of associated TNCs. 
As TNCs often invest in environmentally sensitive sectors, they play a signifi cant 
role in environmental politics and policy. This is an especially important 
consideration in developing countries, where FDI has the ability to have signifi cant 
impacts on both the economy and the environment. In developing countries 
they have tremendous capacity, by threatening relocation and disinvestment, to 
persuade governments to promote the relaxing of environmental regulations in 
order to step up investment and development opportunities. Furthermore, the 
voice of industrial lobby groups at notable international environmental summits 
is clearly and unanimously opposed to legally binding treaties on corporate 
accountability, especially with regard to corporate liability for environmental 
damages as a result of their operations (Clapp 2005:23-31). To date no legally 
binding treaty exists and, although the effectiveness of ‘hard’ or legally binding 
constraints is debatable (see Birger et al. 2006:104-119), it remains a concern 
that TNCs remain largely unaccountable for their actions. 
Policy at a national, and even local, level is thus affected and shaped by the 
position of the state within the climate change debate and by its susceptibility to 
infl uence from business and industry.
THE STATE AND THE CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY PROCESS
In broad terms global environmental change challenges the state, and ultimately 
the policy process, in two fundamental ways. Firstly, the urgency of the problem 
necessitates mitigation and adaptive responses that stress the administrative, 
technological and fi nancial capacities of the state. Secondly, climate such change 
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increases the mutual dependence of states, thereby undermining the strength of 
state sovereignty. The combination of these additional stresses challenges the 
state in its ability to conduct effective government and provide internal security 
(Biermann and Dingwerth 2004:2, 3). The former stress in particular makes the 
delivery of effective and meaningful policy challenging, especially in developing 
nations, where the aforementioned capacities are strained even under normal 
circumstances. 
In the policy process there is a transformation of the policy discourse as 
it is absorbed into the institutional framework; there is a bridging of the gap 
between the rhetoric of the policy discourse and the embracing of this discourse 
by institutions and its actors. In this vein, policies cannot be seen as objective 
or neutral tools, but instead as products of discursive struggles (Bäckstrand & 
Lövbrand 2006:52). The policy environment, although fundamentally defi ned 
by the state, is therefore open to infl uence from a number of national and 
international non-state actors, including industry, commerce/business, NGOs 
and civil society.
The role of the state in environmental management can be summed up 
as unique, necessary and indispensable. Unique in that the logic of the state 
goes beyond market forces to include dimensions such as ethics and social 
justice; necessary because market forces cannot regulate ‘public goods’; 
and indispensable because it addresses issues such as climate change and 
biodiversity, which cannot be dealt with adequately in exclusively economic 
discourse (Guimaraes 2004:205-206). In this regard the electorate entrusts the 
state, as custodian of the natural environment within its boundaries, to prevent 
environmental degradation to the detriment of the wellbeing of its population. 
In many states, including South Africa, the right to ‘an environment that is not 
harmful to their health or well-being’ is constitutionally enshrined (Republic of 
South Africa 1996). 
South Africa and the Policy Process
There are many challenging hindrances to the delivery of a meaningful climate 
change policy process in South Africa. The crosscutting nature of climate 
change necessitates a holistic examination of the policy process, because of its 
implications not only for biodiversity and the quality of essential environmental 
services, but for all sectors of society. 
Environmental Rights and the South African Electorate
Examining the importance of constitutional environmental obligations, in the form 
of rights, in South Africa will serve as a precursor to a more detailed discussion 
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on the diffi culties of the policy process. Although outside the immediate 
parameters of the policy process, popular knowledge of environmental rights has 
great potential to stimulate public debate and lend credence to environmental 
policies. A popular knowledge of environmental rights, in conjunction with 
other rights such as a right to freedom of speech, creates the necessary space 
for the electorate to act, if government is not performing on environmental 
obligations. In Van Reenan’s words: “[there] is no more effective watchdog than 
an informed electorate” (1994:39). 
The South African electorate is not suffi ciently aware of the issues to play 
the role of watchdog in this regard. Research on this subject revealed that a 
large number of South Africans were uncertain as to the exact meaning of the 
term ‘rights of the people’ (Deegan 2002:50). An alert and aware populace, 
backed by environmental rights, is able to check, or popularise concern about, 
state environmental policy if such policy works contrary to the role of the state 
as custodian of the natural environment. Furthermore an informed electorate 
may, through public comment, lend credence and value to the agenda-
setting stage of the policy process. Regrettably, however, and not surprisingly 
given the inequitable access to education in the apartheid era, there is a 
popular ignorance of, and indeed a lack of interest in the signifi cance of, the 
major tenets of democracy in favour of, again not surprisingly, job creation, 
housing and education (Deegan 2002:49). The reality of the South African 
policy environment with regards to the electorate is that there is a dire need 
for awareness and education. In addition poverty, crime, inadequate state 
performance and undeveloped civic responsibility are salient challenges that 
must be addressed, if South Africa is to achieve a measure of success with 
regards to sustainable development (Rossouw and Wiseman 2004:134), of 
which climate change policy is a fundamental an arguably inseparable part. 
The Institutional and Administrative Context 
of Environmental Management
Under the apartheid-era government environmental policy making was centralised 
and technocratically driven and environmental interests were often trumped by 
industrial and business concerns. In addition, the opinions of civil society were 
largely ignored (Peart & Wilson 1998:239-240). Law making was centralised and 
implementation, enforcement and administration of these environmental laws 
and policies were divided between government departments and agencies. In 
short, then, law and policy formation were centralised, while enforcement and 
regulation were dispersed. 
Currently one fi nds a decentralised approach to both the formation and 
the implementation of environmental policy. This division of responsibility 
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between the national and provincial departments in environmental law making 
and administration has resulted in a fragmentation of environmental law and a 
lack of co-ordination with regard to administration and enforcement. Human 
resources have been diluted across too broad a spectrum and it is too costly to 
maintain a large number of departments at national, provincial and local level 
that deal with environmental affairs (Loots 1996:81-86). Furthermore, despite 
the national presence of the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism, 
the administration of the environment is handled by the following departments: 
Mineral Affairs and Energy, Land Affairs, Water Affairs and Forestry, Agriculture, 
South African National Parks and others. This situation is further exacerbated by 
the lack of synergy between the environmental departments at provincial level; 
in the Western Cape, for example, one fi nds the Department of Environment 
Affairs and Development Planning, while the Northern Province has the 
Department of Agriculture, Land and Environment (Glazewski 2005:130-131). 
In addition, as far as environmental matters are concerned, the state has 
detailed areas of exclusive and concurrent competencies with respect to the 
three spheres of government (national, provincial and local) in Schedules 4 and 
5 of the National Environmental Management Act No. 107 (Republic of South 
Africa, 1998). The former relates to items where provinces exercise concurrent 
competencies with national government, while in the latter items of exclusive 
provincial competence are set out. Part B in both schedules lists items of local 
authority competence, where local government has been afforded executive 
authority. Part B matters relating to the environment include ‘Air Pollution’, for 
example, while the more generic ‘pollution control’ is listed as a concurrent 
national and provincial item. There are indeed some areas such as water, 
minerals and energy, for example, that are not listed in Schedules 4 or 5, as 
these are areas of exclusive national competence (Glazewski 2005:132-138).
The delegation of concurrent responsibilities creates a climate of confusion 
and uncertainty, and further strains the administrative capacities of all spheres 
of government. This fragmentation has made co-ordination between policies 
and departments diffi cult and the complexity of the current arrangement 
challenges the national objectives of co-operative governance and integrated 
environmental management. Furthermore, duplication is common and this 
has resulted in a broad range of overlapping mandates and interests, and has 
highlighted the need for a clearer separation of implementation and monitoring 
functions. The latter is clearly evident in the Department of Minerals and Energy 
(DEM), which is responsible both for promoting resource extraction and the 
monitoring and managing the impacts of extraction (Rossouw & Wiseman 
2004:132). Aggravating this, the fragmentation of government into departments 
encourages a ‘special interest’ approach to public policy that results in each 
ministry tending to focus most heavily on the interests of the key producers 
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and professionals in that policy sphere. For example, energy ministers tend to 
view their primary role as protecting the interests of the major energy producers 
(such as coal and nuclear power) and as a result may downplay environmental 
damage associated with the energy sector (Carter 2001:174). 
A further result of this fragmented policy landscape is the fact that 
environmental policies are often developed in isolation from otherwise related 
policies. Land use policies, such as the Development Facilitation Act 67 of 1995, 
which have huge potential to impact on the environment, have been developed 
independently of environmental policy initiatives (Peart & Wilson 1998:264). 
The end result of this fragmented policy landscape has been what can be 
referred to as a ‘policy mess’, where different policies that cover the same areas 
pursue different or even confl icting objectives (Peart & Wilson 1998:243). The 
deluge of policies since 1994 has made integration and co-ordination of policies 
diffi cult and encouraged overlap and – despite their good intentions – they have 
been very diffi cult to implement, indicating a somewhat idealised approach in 
the policy development stage. In sum, the general weaknesses in the policy 
process include the following: key issues are not identifi ed or prioritised; a lack 
of institutional capacity; strong opposition to policy from within departments; 
tight time frames that don’t allow for a thorough public participation process; 
confusion as a result of a lack of consistency in the policy process; a lack of 
clearly defi ned responsibilities and roles; duplication of effort; a lack of social 
and economic information and, when it is available, it is poorly integrated 
with environmental issues; a lack of technical environmental information in 
the development and monitoring of policy; bias in favour of dominant interest 
groups and the exclusion or misrepresentation of certain groups; and fi nally, a 
lack of monitoring and evaluation, partly because the technology to do so has 
not been developed and there are insuffi cient sustainability indicators to aid 
monitoring (Clark et al. 2000:11-13). In large part this long list of weaknesses can 
be attributed to the complex administrative landscape and policy environment 
in which environmental management is situated. 
It is beyond the ambit of this discussion to seek solutions to the administrative 
and institutional arrangements in environmental matters, but it is important 
to note that the current national policy environment does not encourage the 
incubation of effective and meaningful policy that is required if climate change 
and its effects are to be dealt with effectively. 
The Status of the Environment in the Policy Environment
According to Saward (1998:352), the scope within the administrative hierarchy to 
allow for the upward mobility of the environmental ministry is a core consideration 
in environmental policy processes. This consideration is clearly lacking in the 
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South African context and this mobility defi cit will exacerbate the current low-
priority status of climate change and related environmental issues at national level. 
Indeed offi cials in many departments, at all levels of government, simply do not 
see climate change as a priority and, in fact, some even view it as working contrary 
to national development priorities. This is hardly surprising, given that there is a 
limited awareness within government departments as to the likely consequences 
of climate change (Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2004:v). 
Furthermore, from a policy implementation perspective, government is trying to 
do too much with too few resources and prioritising policies and their outcomes 
is clearly lacking (Peart & Wilson 1998:263). Prioritisation is sorely needed, given 
the inability of authorities to deliver in many areas of environmental policy. For 
environmental policy to be effective it needs to be able to fi t into a clearly defi ned 
policy hierarchy, and for the more urgent environmental issues, such as climate 
change, to be awarded priority status. Some attempt was made to address this 
by placing DEAT as the lead agent in the policy-making arena to ensure that 
government policies in all areas do not confl ict with national environmental 
objectives. The subsequent National Environmental Management Act of 1998, 
however, severely diluted the potency of DEAT’s governing role in this regard by 
stipulating that such environmental principles must be considered alongside other 
relevant considerations, such as the social and economic rights detailed in Chapter 
2 of the Constitution. Furthermore, the cooperative governance approach, where 
government departments are persuaded to work more closely together, has been 
adopted and this further dampens hope of DEAT playing a lead role, with the 
likely outcome that the department’s views will regularly be outweighed by those 
of other departments (Peart & Wilson 1998:244-245). 
Economic Challenges
Environmental matters in general have perhaps not featured to the extent they 
should have on the national economic agenda, but what of climate change in 
particular? The ‘National Climate Change Response Strategy for South Africa’ is 
a formalised expression of mitigation/adaptive options available to the climate 
change policy process as well as an expression of the policy boundaries and 
challenges. While there is recognition of the urgent attention needed to address 
climate change and the very real threats it poses to national goals of, inter alia, 
sustainable development and poverty alleviation, great concern is expressed 
about the nation’s two vital industries, mining and energy. In short, if annex 
1 nations respond negatively to the exporting of coal, the vitality of the South 
African economy, which is heavily dependent on income generated from the 
production, processing, export and consumption of coal, will be compromised 
(Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2004:iv).
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 This very real concern can be seen as an economically orientated policy 
boundary or constraint, and it highlights an apparent contradiction in efforts 
to mitigate the effects of climate change; a large proportion of the country’s 
emissions are a direct result of this heavy dependence on coal, yet South 
Africa will continue to rely on coal for decades to come. Indeed the major 
parastatal energy producer, ESKOM, does not internalise the external social or 
environmental costs, which can amount to as much as 126% of the private cost 
of producing energy from coal (Blignaut & Zunckel 2004; 300). Including these 
external costs would raise the cost of energy for the consumer and thereby 
potentially reduce the competitiveness of energy-intensive industries. It is not 
atypical of governments to fail to take measures to improve environmental 
performance and internalise environmental costs, if it is economically 
burdensome on a domestic level to do so and thereby reduce that country’s 
ability to compete fi nancially on a global level (Guimaraes 2004:209). 
Furthermore, this highlights the myopia inherent in electoral politics, which 
stunts or indeed stops the development of policies that imply costs for current 
generations in order to benefi t future generations (Roberts 2004:165).
THE POLICY ENVIRONMENT AT LOCAL LEVEL 
The international climate change regime has indeed fostered learning, but that 
learning is most prevalent outside of the international arena at other levels, 
including domestic, and in many cases is generating imaginative responses 
(Depledge 2006:18&19). Domestic- or local-level action and policy formation 
are thus not to be underestimated and much can be done to address the 
challenges of climate change at this level, despite international ossifi cation and 
policy defi cits at a national level. Arguing for this decentralised approach, Okidi 
(1996:56) points out that the ‘machinery’ in close proximity to the environmental 
resource should have jurisdiction over its management – in this case, it would 
be local government.
Local governments in South Africa enjoy a great degree of independence 
and the power to make by-laws and impose rates (Glazewski 2005:136). 
Furthermore, the Constitution states that one of the objects of local government 
is to ‘promote a safe and healthy environment’ (Republic of South Africa, 1996). 
Local governments therefore not only have the power to manage their own 
environments, but are constitutionally obliged to do so. 
In the policy process the local sphere of government in South Africa is largely 
responsible for the implementation of policy formed at national and provincial 
levels. Central government tends to develop broader policies and these can be 
detailed at local and provincial levels (Clark et al. 2000:7). This has presented a 
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myriad of problems or challenges at a local level. Among these are a failure to 
consult local government in policy formation and a failure to recognise the role 
of local government in this process. Furthermore, local government suffers from 
a lack of representation in core national environmental legislation, indicative of 
the policy implementation gaps that plague the policy atmosphere in South Africa 
(Rossouw and Wiseman 2004:133, 134). A further problem experienced at local 
level is that of capacity; the highly beauracratised environmental management 
system often results in the passing of legislation or the issuing of regulations 
without considering the lack of capacity to support this response (Van Reenen 
1994: 39; Glazewski 2005:132). Local governments need to be capacitated and 
skilled in order to deal with the complexity of climate change-related matters. 
The close proximity of local government to its constituency demands 
interaction and communication with it. Local governments in South Africa 
have a role to play that extends beyond the ambit of service delivery to include 
fostering and managing the participation of marginalized and excluded groups, 
thereby encouraging a democratic approach to council activities and ultimately 
promoting community involvement (Deegan 2002:52). In South Africa the policy 
processes are highly regarded for their high levels of public participation and 
the inclusion of civil society is often seen as a prerequisite for a sustainable and 
representative policy process (Clark et al. 2000:10). But this process, although 
necessary, is cumbersome and presents an additional challenge to the policy 
process. Local communities are by defi nition a diverse group consisting of a 
myriad of income groups, races and social classes, all with different interests, 
priorities and values. This diversity of interests will result in a confl ict of interests 
and local government must therefore act as the fi nal arbitrator in this volley of 
confl icting interests, and it is unlikely that any one interest group will have its 
desires met in full (Deegan 2002:52). Acting as arbitrator and managing public 
participation is time consuming and costly, and it stretches local government 
capacities. Given the diversity of adaptations that civil society may be required 
to undertake and comment on in support of a climate change policy, this lack of 
capacity represents a core consideration in policy environment. 
Case Study: 
The EThekwini Municipality and Climate Change Policy
The EThekwini Municipal Area (EMA) is situated on South Africa’s east coast 
littoral in the province of KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) and covers an area of 2297 
square kilometres. Although only 1.4% of the land area of KZN, it houses over 
30% of the population of KZN and as much as 60% of the provinces economic 
activity occurs here. Within the municipal limits a broad diversity of land uses 
occurs including residential, commercial, industrial and agricultural, with a 
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number of densely populated informal settlements found within urban and peri-
urban areas. The community is similarly diverse, representing a cross-section 
of race, culture, religion, income group and age. EMA is South Africa’s major 
port city and is the second largest industrial hub after Gauteng. The city is a key 
trade gateway as a result of its access to important trading routes to the east and 
its proximity to the mineral-industrial complex of Gauteng. The city’s economy 
grew by 5.3% for the period 2005-2006. The municipality recognises its role 
in providing democratic and accountable governance, providing services, 
promoting socio-economic development and a safe and healthy environment 
(EThekwini Municipality 2007:6, 7). 
 In response to the growing realisation of the negative implications of 
climate change and the requisite mitigation and adaptive strategies, the EMA 
commissioned the CSIR to detail a report on the climatic future of Durban 
(CSIR 2006). Salient predictions as to the likely consequences of climate change 
include, inter alia, an increase in temperature, a rise in sea level and associated 
storm surges, a change in rainfall distribution, a reduction in the water 
available for consumption and industry, a decrease in agricultural production, 
the spreading of malaria into the EMA and a loss of biodiversity (CSIR 2006: 
59-77). These effects, although still clouded with degrees of uncertainty, are 
certainly dire and it is prudent to consider in the light of the precautionary 
principle 
In the light of the abovementioned signifi cance of public participation, an 
initial step, and indeed challenge, for the EMA is to gain public support for 
climate change policies. In order to instigate signifi cant change to society with 
regards to environmental issues, ‘winning the hearts and minds of most sections 
of society’ is essential (Roberts 2004:166). Given the aforementioned diversity 
of the population of Durban, this is no easy task. In an attempt to understand 
public perception of climate change in the EMA more fully, a questionnaire-
based research programme was conducted (CSIR 2006: 116-153). 46% of the 
respondents claimed they did not know much about climate change, or that 
they knew nothing at all. It was concluded that the majority of respondents have 
a limited understanding of climate change and, furthermore, are unaware as to 
the causes of climate change. Most participants viewed themselves as external 
to the solution and commonly believed that it was up to industry to fi nd the 
answers (CSIR 2006:126). Education and raising awareness on the subject of 
climate change can be viewed as a critical challenge to the EMA, if there is to 
be support for local climate change policy initiatives. 
A further challenge is the apparent power defi cit that inhibits the 
effectiveness of the city’s environmental authority. The Environmental 
Management Department (EMD) of the EMA does not have the power to 
make fi nal decisions on environmental applications, although its comments 
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are usually taken into account and required conditions, instigated by the EMD, 
‘usually become conditions of approval’. The EMD is therefore a commenting 
authority requiring the department to communicate with other departments 
and authorities, not only at local, but also at provincial and national level. 
This has necessitated the creation of a forum between the EMD and the 
provincial Department of Agriculture and Environmental Affairs. This forum 
has been established to aid communications between the two spheres of 
government and assist in reducing confl ict between the two. The EMD is 
currently attempting the creation of a similar forum to communicate with the 
Department of Minerals and Energy. These forums are an integral part of the 
principles of cooperative governance (EThekwini Municipality 2007:42). The 
need for the creation of forums is indicative of the administrative powerlessness 
of the EMD and it is postulated here that this process exacerbates problems 
associated with a lack of capacity. Furthermore, this cumbersome process 
highlights that the great need for environmental departments to move up the 
hierarchy, as discussed above in a national context, also applies to a local 
level. This mobility defi cit stunts the EMD’s ability to fast-track policy and is 
bound to entrench an approach of incremental change in the policy process, 
rather than the need for rapid adjustment that meaningful and effective climate 
change policy demands. 
Mapping the progress of a core environmental policy process found within 
the EMA will serve to highlight how these hierarchical challenges have affected 
the EMD in its environmental, and ultimately social, obligations. The Durban 
Metropolitan Open Space System (D’MOSS), initially instigated by an NGO in 
1979, survived the transition politics of the democratisation of South Africa in the 
early 1990s by shifting focus to include socio-economic and equity concerns. 
By conserving and carefully managing the open spaces within municipal 
limits the D’MOSS system is designed to ensure the sustainable delivery of 
environmental goods and services. In 2001 D’MOSS was reconstituted as the 
EThekweni Environmental Services Management Plan (EESMP) and 54% of the 
EMA surface area was deemed as optimal and set aside for the open space 
system for the city. Growing development pressure and an attempt to secure 
long-term political support for the programme, however, required that the size 
of the system be reduced from 123 000 ha to 76 000 ha. In 2002 the area was 
remapped and reassessed, and once again, in order to accommodate the city’s 
pressing development needs, only those areas vital to the viability of the system 
were included and the total was further reduced from 76 000 ha to 63 115 ha 
(or 27% of the EMA) (EThekwini Municipality 2007:11). The salient trend in this 
programme has been the reduction in the size of the open space area (from 
54% to 27%) and this is a direct result of political and development pressure. 
The EMD does not have suffi cient capacity to challenge these reductions and 
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in its capacity as a commenting authority it can do little more than lobby for 
support for its initiatives. 
Related to this power defi cit is the inability of the EMD to effectively 
implement regulations to ensure the integrity of the EESMP. Power, in this 
instance, refers to the extent of power that municipalities have over their 
constituencies rather than the power to move within the administrative hierarchy 
as discussed above. In short, the EMD has no legal mandate to enforce the law 
and the department must seek other means to enforce regulation. One method 
used by the department when dealing with non-compliance from the public 
sector is compliance monitoring. To this end the EMD endeavours to ensure that 
the relevant government departments take action when there is non-compliance 
with regulations (EThekwini Municipality 2007:47). Lacking the power therefore 
to enforce its own regulations, the EMD has to rely on other departments to give 
these regulations clout. This is a seemingly cumbersome process that demands 
time and effort from departments outside the environmental management 
framework and has the potential to exacerbate the capacity issues that plague 
the local administration. In response to this the EMD has intentions of drafting 
‘green’ environmental by-laws to protect the natural resource base of the EMA 
and to ensure the effective implementation on EESMP, but this has yet to be 
realised (EThekwini Municipality 2007:47). For the effective and meaningful 
implementation of climate change policy, this is an essential step forward. In 
the latter half of 2007 it was proposed that the EESMP should be revised once 
again and climate change (and its impacts on biodiversity) will be introduced 
into the plan (EThekwini Municipality 2007:18). Without the requisite power 
and the inability to move upwards in the administrative hierarchy, the EMD has 
limited potential to make a meaningful contribution towards providing a safe 
and healthy environment for its citizenry. 
To a large extent local municipalities suffer from the same economically 
orientated policy boundaries as national government. 
CONCLUSION
Mitigating the effects of climate change and learning to adapt to these 
consequences requires good governance on international, national and domestic 
levels. The delivery of good governance is realised in large part through the 
implementation of meaningful and effective policy that is dependent on a 
healthy policy environment for success. This policy environment is infl uenced 
by, inter alia, international, national and local agendas as well as administrative 
and legal arrangements. An attempt has been made in this article to highlight 
the negative infl uences of these agendas on the policy environment. Because of 
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the great scale of this environmental problem, climate change policy demands 
the rapid formulation of policy and effective implementation.
 An examination of the situation in practice, however, highlights some of the 
more salient reasons for the shortcomings in this regard. On an international level 
the climate change debate is stifl ed by the diversity of confl icting agendas and 
the North/South divide, leaving the critical issue of emissions reduction targets 
unsolved. The knock-on effects of this are felt at a national level and to some 
extent pollute the South African policy environment. Aggravating this are complex 
administrative systems that complicate the policy environment and limit the potency 
of environmental authorities to deliver on their environmental and ultimately social 
obligations. At a local level the policy process is similarly fl awed, aggravated by 
the weighty responsibility of acting as arbitrator in the public participation process 
and a lack of capacity. The struggles experienced by the environmental authority 
of the Ethekwini Municipality are examples of these challenges. 
NOTES
1 This article forms part of an ongoing research project supported by the National Research 
Foundation
2 This article is based on a research paper by Richard White in partial fulfi lment of the requirements 
for obtaining a Masters degree in Environmental Management at Stellenbosch University
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